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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
Nos. 15-2781 and 15-3068 
_____________ 
 
JHONATHAN VICTORIA JAVIER, 
                                                  Petitioner  
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 
                                                     Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals 
(A059-303-967) 
Immigration Judge: Walter Durling 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: June 9, 2016) 
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Raymond G. Lahoud, Esq. 
Baurkot & Baurkot 
227 South 7th Street 
Easton, PA 18042 
 
Attorney for Petitioner 
 
Elizabeth R. Chapman, Esq. 
Kristin A. Moresi, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
  
 Attorneys for Respondent 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION  
______________ 
 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Jhonathan Victoria Javier petitions for review of two 
orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) order of removal.  
For the reasons that follow, we will dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction the petition for review of the BIA’s order dated 
July 13, 2015 and deny the petition for review of the BIA’s 
order dated August 19, 2015. 
I. BACKGROUND 
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 Javier is a citizen and native of the Dominican 
Republic.  In 2009, he entered the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident.  In July 2013, Javier was arrested for 
carrying a firearm in public, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 6108, and for making terroristic threats, in violation of 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1).  He was convicted of both 
charges in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County, Pennsylvania, in March 2014. 
 Later in 2014, the Department of Homeland Security 
issued Javier a notice to appear, charging him with 
removability due to his convictions.  Following a removal 
hearing held on April 2, 2015,1 the IJ issued an oral decision 
concluding that Javier was removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(i) as an alien convicted of a “crime involving 
moral turpitude” based on his conviction for terroristic 
threats.2  The IJ also concluded that Javier was removable 
                                                 
 1  At Javier’s request, the IJ continued his removal 
proceedings while Javier pursued post-conviction relief in 
state court.  At the April 2, 2015 hearing, Javier informed the 
IJ that his requests for post-conviction relief had been denied. 
 2 Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) also requires that the “crime 
involving moral turpitude” be one for which “a sentence of 
one year or longer may be imposed” and that the crime be 
“committed within five years . . . after the [alien’s] date of 
admission.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).  These requirements 
are not at issue in this petition.   
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pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) as an alien convicted of 
a “firearm offense” based on his conviction for carrying a 
firearm in public. 
 Javier appealed to the BIA.  In an order dated August 
19, 2015, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s order of removal and 
dismissed Javier’s appeal based solely on Javier’s terroristic 
threats conviction. 3   The BIA explained that the offense 
defined by 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1) involves “an 
intentional action whose goal is to inflict [] psychological 
distress [that follows an invasion of the victim’s sense of 
personal security which] violates the norms of society to such 
a degree as to constitute moral turpitude.”  A.R. 4 (citing 
Commonwealth v. Tizer, 684 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. Super. 
1996)).  The BIA concluded that it “need not address the 
                                                 
 3 Javier filed a notice of appeal of the IJ’s April 2, 2015 
order but did not submit a brief until July 10, 2015, three days 
before the BIA issued its opinion.  On July 13, 2015, the BIA 
summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision on the basis that Javier’s 
notice of appeal was insufficient to apprise the BIA of the 
grounds for Javier’s appeal.  Javier then resubmitted his brief 
along with a motion for reconsideration explaining the 
reasons for the delay in transmitting his brief.  In its August 
19, 2015 order, the BIA explained that it had accepted 
Javier’s reasons and sua sponte reopened Javier’s appeal to 
consider the arguments in his brief.  Javier has petitioned for 
review of both the BIA’s July 13, 2015 and August 19, 2015 
orders; by Order dated August 26, 2015, we consolidated 
Javier’s petitions. 
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question of whether [Javier’s] conviction for carrying 
firearms in public in violation of Pennsylvania law also 
renders [him] removable.”  Id.  Javier then submitted this 
timely petition, arguing that the BIA erred as a matter of law 
in concluding that a section 2706(a)(1) offense is 
categorically a “crime involving moral turpitude” and that the 
IJ erred as a matter of law in concluding that a section 6108 
offense is categorically a “firearm offense.” 
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of 
removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  We “review the 
administrative record on which the final removal order is 
based.”  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 425 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (quoting Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d 
Cir. 2005)).  “[T]hat means reviewing only the BIA’s 
decision” unless the BIA’s decision “specifically references 
the IJ’s decision.”  Id.4 
 We review legal determinations by the BIA de novo, 
“subject to established principles of deference.”  Wang v. 
                                                 
 4  Thus, contrary to Javier’s assertion, we lack 
jurisdiction to review the IJ’s decision that 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 6108 constitutes a “firearm offense” because the BIA did 
not reference the IJ’s decision on this issue.  We also lack 
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s July 13, 2015 order 
dismissing Javier’s appeal because it is not a final order of 
removal; the BIA reopened Javier’s case.  Therefore, we will 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction Javier’s petition for review of 
the BIA’s July 13, 2015 order. 
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Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004).  We afford 
deference to the BIA’s definition of moral turpitude, but we 
owe no deference to the BIA’s interpretation of a state 
criminal statute.  See Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 87 n.3, 
88 (3d Cir. 2004). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 “In determining whether a state law conviction 
constitutes a [crime involving moral turpitude] . . . we[] have 
historically applied a ‘categorical’ approach, ‘focusing on the 
underlying criminal statute rather than the alien’s specific 
act.’”  Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 465 (3d Cir. 
2009) (quoting Knapik, 384 F.3d at 88).  Under the 
categorical approach, “we read the applicable statute to 
ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a 
conviction under the statute.”  Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 
408, 411 (3d Cir. 2005).  If “a statute covers both 
turpitudinous and non-turpitudinous acts” then we turn to a 
modified categorical approach and “look to the record of 
conviction to determine whether the alien was convicted 
under that part of the statute defining a crime involving moral 
turpitude.”  Id.  “The modified categorical approach still 
‘retains the categorical approach’s central feature:  a focus on 
the elements, rather than the facts, of a crime.’”  United States 
v. Brown, 765 F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting 
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 (2013)). 
 As a general rule, a criminal statute is determined to 
define a crime as categorically involving “moral turpitude 
only if all of the conduct [the statute] prohibits is 
turpitudinous.”  Partyka, 417 F.3d at 411 (quoting Smalley v. 
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003)).  “[T]he 
hallmark of moral turpitude is a reprehensible act committed 
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with an appreciable level of consciousness or deliberation.”  
Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Partyka, 417 F.3d at 414).  Although the 
Immigration and Nationality Act does not define “moral 
turpitude,” “the BIA and this Circuit have defined morally 
turpitudinous conduct as ‘conduct that is inherently base, vile, 
or depraved, contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the 
duties owed to other persons, either individually or to society 
in general.’”  Id. (quoting Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89).  An act is 
turpitudinous if it “is accompanied by a vicious motive or a 
corrupt mind.”  Partyka, 417 F.3d at 413 (quoting Matter of 
Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868 (BIA 1994)). 
 Here, Title 18, Section 2706(a) of the Pennsylvania 
Consolidated Statutes is divisible into three variations of the 
same offense—i.e., subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3).  See 
Brown, 765 F.3d at 191–92.  Javier was convicted under 
section 2706(a)(1).  See A.R. 230 (Order of Sentence stating 
that Javier was convicted under “18 § 2706 §§ A1,” which the 
Order entitled “Terroristic Threats W/ Int To Terrorize 
Another”).  Section 2706(a)(1) states that “[a] person 
commits the crime of terroristic threats if the person 
communicates, either directly or indirectly, a threat to: [] 
commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize 
another.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1).  As discussed 
below, because of this specific intent requirement, we need 
not look any further to determine that a violation of section 
2706(a)(1) is a “crime involving moral turpitude.”  Cf. 
Commonwealth v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999, 1001 (Pa. Super. 
2003) (“[O]ne commits terroristic threats [] by threatening a 
crime of violence with specific intent to cause terror 
(subsection 1), or by threatening anything that causes terror 
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with reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror 
(subsection 3).”).5 
 Javier argues that “crime of violence” encompasses 
simple assault, which he contends is a non-turpitudinous 
crime.  Therefore, he contends, the statute encompasses the 
non-turpitudinous crime of threatening to commit simple 
assault and the BIA erred in concluding that section 
2706(a)(1) is categorically a “crime involving moral 
turpitude.” 
 We disagree.  Our focus in determining whether 
section 2706(a)(1) is categorically a crime involving moral 
turpitude is not the threatened “crime of violence,” but the 
communication of the threat and its requisite scienter.  After 
all, the harm that section 2706(a)(1) seeks to prevent is not 
the “crime of violence,” but rather the consequences of the 
threat—i.e., “the psychological distress that follows from an 
invasion of another’s sense of personal security.”  
Commonwealth v. Fenton, 750 A.2d 863, 865 (Pa. Super. 
2000) (quoting Tizer, 684 A.2d at 600).  And section 
2706(a)(1) unambiguously requires that the threat be 
communicated with a specific “intent to terrorize.”  18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1); Walker, 836 A.2d at 1001. 
                                                 
 5 Javier argues that the BIA erred by not applying the 
modified categorical approach to evaluate whether his 
conviction constituted a crime involving moral turpitude.  
This argument is unavailing.  Under either the categorical 
approach or modified categorical approach, we would still 
conclude that Javier was convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude. 
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 A threat communicated with intent to terrorize is of a 
different character than simple assault, and therefore we do 
not equate such a threat with simple assault.  See Chanmouny 
v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810, 814–15 (8th Cir. 2004) (reasoning 
that Minnesota terroristic threat statute’s “requisite intent to 
terrorize [] serves to distinguish Chanmouny’s offense from 
simple assault” because “[s]imple assault typically is a 
general intent crime, and it is thus different in character”).  
We conclude that a threat communicated with a specific 
intent to terrorize is an act “accompanied by a vicious motive 
or a corrupt mind” so as to be categorically morally 
turpitudinous.  See Partyka, 417 F.3d at 413.  Because the 
BIA did not legally err by so concluding, we will deny 
Javier’s petition.6 
                                                 
 6 Javier’s reliance on Larios v. Attorney General, 402 
F. App’x 705 (3d Cir. 2010), is unavailing.  There, a panel of 
this Court found that an analogous New Jersey terroristic 
threat statute encompassed non-turpitudinous conduct 
because it could be applied to a threat to commit simple 
assault.  Id. at 709.  The panel reasoned that because simple 
assault is non-turpitudinous, a threat to commit simple assault 
is non-turpitudinous.  Id.  Larios is a not precedential opinion 
which we are not bound to follow.  We disagree with the 
panel’s focus on the “crime of violence,” rather than the 
criminalized conduct itself—which requires a malicious 
scienter.  It has long been established that “moral turpitude 
normally inheres in the intent.”  See, e.g., Jean-Louis, 582 
F.3d at 469 (quoting Matter of Abreu-Semino, 12 I. & N. Dec. 
775, 777 (BIA 1968)); see also Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 
263 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[C]orrupt scienter is the touchstone of 
moral turpitude.”).  Therefore, we focus on the intent required 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss for lack of 
jurisdiction the petition for review of the BIA’s order dated 
July 13, 2015 and deny the petition for review of the BIA’s 
order dated August 19, 2015. 
                                                                                                             
by section 2706(a)(1) and agree with the BIA that the offense 
as defined under section 2706(a)(1) is categorically a crime 
involving moral turpitude. 
